54
EoinMacNeill andHisCountermandOrder
The decisionof EoinMacNeill, as commander of the IrishVolun-
teers, to issueacountermand to theorder forVolunteers tomobilise
onEaster Sunday1916was a crucial interventionbornof anger at a
serious deception. Itwas apivotal decision inmodern Irishhistory
and adefining event inMacNeill’s career and in relation tohis leg-
acy. Itwashis reaction to thedeceitof those in the IrishRepublican
Brotherhood (IRB)whowere intent onusingplannedmobilisation
of theVolunteers fornormaldrillingpurposes thatSunday inorder
to launcha rebellion todeclare an Irish republic.MacNeill’s coun-
termand led to thepostponement ofwhat became theEasterRising
untilMonday, andensured that a lot lessVolunteersmobilised than
washoped and that theRisingwasheavily concentrated inDublin.
By issuing this countermandMacNeill prevented the IRB having
cover for anationwide rising.
Two and a half years earlier, on 1 November 1913, MacNeill had
writtien an article entitled “The North began” in
An Claideamh
Soluis
, the newspaper of the Gaelic League. It called for the for-
mationof an IrishVolunteer force to emulate theUlsterVolunteer
Force established in January 1913. MacNeill was subsequently ap-
proached by Irish separatists associated with the IRB and asked
to take the lead in forming the Irish Volunteers. It was launched
in Dublin on 25 November 1913, with MacNeill as command-
er-in-chief. The formation of the Volunteers marked a significant
increase in political temperature, but there was also vagueness
about its aims and disagreements about its methods and who
should control it.
The third home rule bill had been introduced in April 1912 and
was expected to come into force in the summer of 1914 and the
IrishVolunteerswasostensibly formed toensure itwouldbe imple-
mented, but what did that mean in practice?MacNeill character-
ised theVolunteers as adefensive rather thandefiant organisation:
“ the IrishVolunteers, if they are amilitary force, are not amilita-
rist force, and their object is to secure Ireland’s rights and liberties
and nothing else”. This was interpreted in different ways, and the
Volunteers, eventuallynumbering roughly150,000,was a catch-all
group; of the 30men selected to form its Provisional Committee,
most were affiliated to other organisations and 12 belonged to the
IRB.
With the outbreak of the Great War, the leader of the Irish Par-
liamentaryParty, JohnRedmond appealed to individual IrishVol-
unteers to join the war effort as amoral imperative andMacNeill
accused him of mental andmoral corruption and insisted British
parties were conspiring to defeat home rule which only the Irish
Volunteerscouldprevent.A split ensued,withRedmond supported
by amajority of Volunteers, by a ratio of 15 to one, now termed the
National Volunteers, while MacNeill retained command of the mi-
nority, keeping theoriginal title.
For all his anger and accusations at the time of this split, anddespite
thepostponement of the implementationofhome ruledue to thewar,
MacNeill, though not a pacifist, did not believe an Irish Volunteer
uprisingwas feasibleor justified, as itwould lead to suppressionof the
organisationandabandonmentofhome rule.His logic, as enunciated
inFebruary1916, was clear; theonly justification for rebellionwould
be “deepandwidespreadpopulardiscontent”, but “no suchcondition
exists in Ireland”.As farashewasconcernedany rebellionby theVol-
unteers shouldbeas a result of aBritishact of aggressionorbecausea
rebellionwouldhave a reasonable chanceof success.
His opponents believed the defensive strategy left Britain in the
driving seat; the IRB operated surreptitiously under the cloak of the
Volunteers, laying plans for a rebellion, andMacNeill was reluctant
to confront them for fear of more splits. While it was the case that
the longer the war went on themore dissatisfied nationalist Ireland
became, the IRB was still a dedicated elite and the Irish Volunteer
movement on the eveof the 1916Risingwas still only15,000 strong.
Early inApril 1916 the IRB group convincedMacNeill that a crack-
down on the Volunteers by the British was imminent by producing
a “Castle document”, which though based on genuine contingency
plans, had been altered by JosephPlunkett tomake the situation ap-
pear urgent. Only onMaundyThursday, 20April, didMacNeill dis-
cover that the IRB groupwas using preparations for a general mobi-
lisation onEaster weekend to bring about a rising onEaster Sunday.
MacNeill initiallyacquiesced, but afterdiscovering that anarms ship
sent fromGermany to assist the rebels had been sunk, and that the
Castle document had been forged, he had a stormymeetingwith the
rebel planners and then sent outmessengers around the country, in-
cludingEdwardMoran inKildare, orderingageneraldemobilisation,
following this upwith an advertisement to that effect in the
Sunday
Independent
.
As a result of MacNeill’s countermand, the 1916 Rising was almost
entirely confined toDublin; even there, thenumberswereonly about
a quarter ofwhat theymight otherwise have been. The countermand
order was one reason why the Rising commenced in confused cir-
cumstances; crucially, it was also a reflection of disagreement about
theRising’s validity.
MacNeill’s reputation has been dominated by his role in issuing the
countermand order. By the 1960s and 1970s, sympathisers sought
to rehabilitate his reputation; historian F.X.Martin insisted he was
